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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Randi Marvidikis Hales, daughter of the owner of the Appellant
corporation, Hales Sand and Gravel, died July 31,1986. Since her death
occurred in the course of her employment, and since she left no dependents,
the Appellant was ordered to pay $30,000 into the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
The order was entered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(a).
If the commission has made a determination that there are no
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to the lapse of one year from
the date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for
the employer or insurance carrier to pay into the Uninsured Employers'
Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in the Uninsured
Employers' Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall
thereafter be paid into the Second Injury Fund. If the amount in the
Uninsured Employers' Fund falls below $500,000 at any time after
reaching the initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into
either the Second Injury Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund as may
be required so as to maintain the Uninsured Employers* Fund at or near
$500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be reduced
by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or due the
deceased between the date of the accident and death. If a dependency
claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order and, thereafter,
a determination of dependency is made by the commission, the award
shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to the Uninsured
Employers' Fund or the Second Injury Fund by the employer or
insurance carrier before any further claim may be asserted against the
employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is filed within one
year from the date of death, the commission's temporary order shall
become permanent and final. If no temporary order has been issued and
no claim for dependency has been filed within one year from the date of
death, the commission may issue a permanent order at any time
requiring the carrier or employer to pay $30,000 into the Second Injury
Fund. Any claim for compensation by a dependent must be filed with the
commission within one year from the date of death of the deceased.
This statute provides that an employer or the employer's insurance carrier may
be required to pay $30,000 into the Uninsured Employers' Fund should an
employee die without dependents. The $30,000 becomes a mandatory
payment if the amount in either the Uninsured Employers' Fund or the Second
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Injury Fund falls below $500,000. A statutory funeral allowance of $1,800 is
also required.
The Appellant filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Industrial
Commission challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68
(2)(a). Appellant claimed this statute unduly burdens the corporation and others
similarly situated in that the corporation is required to stand the cost of
insurance coverage for uninsured employers and consequently subsidize his
competitors in the marketplace.

|

The Industrial Commission denied Appellant's Motion for Review and
affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge requiring payment.
Appellant brings this appeal as a result of that affirmation.
Subsequent to these actions, through the efforts of the Appellant, the
legislature repealed the statutory provision under which the payment was
ordered. House Bill No. 208,1987 General Session.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND REAL NATURE AND INCIDENTS OF THE NO

DEPENDENT DEATH BENEFIT SUBSTANTIATE THE TAX STATUS OF THE
BENEFIT.

A "tax" has been defined as," an enforced contribution of money or other
property by authority of a sovereign state from persons or property within its
jurisdiction for the purpose of defraying the public expenses." Garrett Freight
Lines. Inc.. v. State Tax Commission. 103 Utah 390,135 P.2d 523 (Utah 1943).
A tax is determined to be such not depending particularly on the name given it
but, more precisely by the legislative intent and its real nature and the incidents
thereof. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization. 166
P.2d917(Ca. 1946).
Respondent cites the cases of Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp..
113 Utah 415,196 P.2d 487 (Utah 1948), and Star v. Industrial Commission.
615 P.2d 436 (Utah 1980), as support for the theory that payment of the no
dependent death benefit into the Uninsured Employers' Fund is not a tax, but
rather compensation. In Henrie. the nondependent father whose son was killed
on the job claimed that payment of the death benefit into the state treasury was
not compensation as the term was used in Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah
Constitution because it did not benefit him. Mr. Henrie maintained, therefore,
that he was entitled to sue Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation for wrongful
death. The Court found that compensation was payable to dependents only
and did not require payment to or for the benefit of nondependent parents. The
Court further found that no dependent death benefits were compensation in that
they were not only paid out for workmen and their dependents, but also for
disability payments, death benefits, medical, hospital and burial expenses, and
other payments as provided by the Act. Star also dealt with a nondependent
4

parent challenging the payment of the death benefit into the special fund and
Henrie was cited as support.
In spite of the fact that the Utah Supreme Court has intimated through its
findings in Henrie and Star that no dependent death benefit payments into the
special funds are compensation, it is obvious that such findings did not
consider, nor was it necessary under the particular facts, that these payments
were a tax. Rather, the Court was defining compensation so as to preclude
wrongful death recoveries.
In order to determine if the no dependent death benefit is indeed a tax,
the legislative intent must be acknowledged. In fttar. the Court referred to
tlenrja in stating:
[T]he compensation acts were intended to secure workmen and
their dependents (not heirs and personal representatives) against
becoming objects of charity, by making reasonable compensation for
calamities incidental to the employment and to include these ensuing
expenses as part of the cost of production.
Supia, at p. 438.
The intent then was to compensate employees and their dependents for injury
and death and thereby prevent their dependence on charity and welfare. There
can be no doubt that the legislature did not intend that the state would be
compensated. Therefore, payments made from the Uninsured Employers'
Fund could be compensation, but payments made into the Fund could not
conceivably be compensation. Rather, the no dependent death benefit is paid
into the Fund in the form of a tax, although it may not be specifically referred to
as such. The real nature of the payment is that it is an enforced contribution by
the State on employers for a public purpose, namely to compensate workmen
and their dependents so that they will not have to depend on welfare.
That the benefit paid by the Appellant into the Uninsured Employers'
Fund is a taxing measure is further substantiated by how that money is spent.
5

As per Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -107(2), the funds are not only used to
compensate workers and their dependents, but also to pay the costs of
administration. Further, Respondent states in its brief, "the Industrial
Commission investigates over 4,000 suspected uninsured employers yearly
since the creation of the Uninsured Employers' Fund provided the funding
necessary to conduct those investigations." The sheer volume of these
investigations amounts to a sizable cost, and surely the Court could not find
such expenditures are compensation to workmen or their dependents. The
Uninsured Employers' Fund is taxing employers to support the functions of
government and to compensate workmen and their dependents. That
payments into the Fund purport to be compensation should not prevent this
Court from calling a "tax" a "tax" when presented with all the facts.

POINT II:

T H E NO DEPENDENT DEATH BENEFIT AS AN APPROPRIATE EXERCISE OF THE

STATE'S POLICE POWER MUST ABIDE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES.

Appellant does not argue that the State, under its police powers, has the
right to set up an Uninsured Employers' Fund. Appellant does argue that
requiring an employer to pay into such a fund upon the fortuitous circumstance
that an employee dies without dependents is not a reasonable basis for
classification and does, therefore, violate the principles of equal protection.
Appellant also argues that requiring payment by insured, solvent employers into
a fund created to benefit the employees of insolvent or uninsured employers is
discriminatory and, therefore, adverse to equal protection principles.
Respondent cites the case of Salt Lake Citv v. Industrial Commission. 58
Utah 314,199 P.152 (Utah 1921) to support its contention that the no
dependent death benefit is not a denial of equal protection. The facts and
circumstances involved in that case are very different from those in the case at
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bar. In Salt Lake City, the Plaintiff was required to pay the no dependent death
benefit because he was not insured by the State Insurance Fund. The Court
found no discrimination as the State had made a large financial contribution to
industries employing labor when it could have put all of the burden back on
industry. The Court further observed that the Plaintiff had a choice as to
whether to be self-insured or to insure through the State fund.
In the instant case and under the law as it existed when Appellant's case
was brought, the no dependent death benefit was required of all employers
whose employees died without dependents. Therefore, there was no choice as
to whether Appellant would be subject to payment into the Uninsured
Employers* Fund. Further, the discrimination in the instant case was not in favor
of the State, but rather in favor of employees whose employers were either
insolvent or have no insurance.
The payment of no dependent death benefits was upheld as
constitutional in both United Air Lines Transport Corporation, et al. v. Industrial
Commission, et al.. 107 Utah 52, 151 P.2d 591 (Utah 1944), and Sheehan v.
Shuler. 265 U.S. 371, 44 S. Ct. 548, 68 LEd. 1061 (1924). However, the funds
in these two cases, the Combined Injury Fund in United and funds for
additional compensation due to permanent total disability and for vocational
education in Sheehan. were created to benefit the employees of all employers.
In analyzing the basis for the Uninsured Employers' Fund in the instant case, it
cannot be ignored that this Fund was established to benefit only those
employees whose employers are insolvent or uninsured. Further, although all
employers are required to pay into the Fund when an employee dies without
dependents, it is doubtful that an insolvent or uninsured employer will indeed
have the means to pay the no dependent death benefit. Therefore, the solvent,
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insured employer ends up bearing most, if not all, of the burden for the
employees of insolvent, uninsured employers.
Respondent cites several sections from Utah Code Annotated to support
the theory that insolvent or uninsured employers are subject to liability for
injuries to their employees in at least as great a degree as are those employers
who are solvent and insured. Specifically, Respondent cites Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-107(1) and (3) which creates the Uninsured Employers' Fund and also
provides the Fund with subrogation rights as to the insolvent employer when the
Fund pays benefits to the employee. While such provisions appear to equalize
the positions of the solvent, insured employers and the insolvent, uninsured
employers, it is in theory only. In practice, it is unlikely that the State or the
employee will be able to collect anything from the insolvent employer as the
very existence of his insolvency makes him judgment proof. Therefore,
provisions for collecting payments from insolvent, uninsured employers do not
equalize the positions of the solvent and insolvent employers in reality.
Home Ace. Ins. Co.. et al. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, et al.. 269
P.501 (Az. 1928), is cited by Respondent as authority for the idea that the no
dependent death benefit is an occupational tax rather than a tax on property
and, as such, is not subject to constitutional limitations. This case is also used
to refute Appellant's argument that a no dependent death benefit is
discriminatory and arbitrary as supported by People v. Yosemite Lumber Co..
216 P. 39 (Ca. 1923).
That the tax imposed by way of the no dependent death benefit in the
instant case may be an occupational tax as opposed to a tax on property is
irrelevant as occupational taxes are also subject to constitutional limitations in
that they must be "uniform, fair, and equitable, bearing alike on all persons and
subjects embraced in the same class and in similar circumstances." 16C C.J.S.
8

Constitutional Law §890. In Home Ace. Ins. Co.. the Arizona Court stated that
the purpose of the exaction was "not to meet the currerit expenses of
government, but to recompense employees of the industries on whom the
burden is imposed for injuries received by them while engaged in the pursuit of
their employments." Home Ace. Supra at p. 505. The tax in that case was to be
paid into the rehabilitation fund of the State for the benefit of all employees.
This again is very different from the tax imposed in the instant case which is not
only used to recompense employees of insolvent and uninsured employers, but
to pay the costs of administration and of investigating suspected uninsured
employers. Therefore, the exactions imposed in the case at bar axe, used "to
meet the current expenses of government."
In distinouishino Yosemite Lumber Co. v. Industrial Ace. Commission.
204 P. 226, (Ca. 1922), Respondent correctly points out that the case dealt with
a statute that exceeded the authority granted by the California Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Court found that the unconstitutional act was a taxing law
irrespective of the fact that it exceeded constitutional authority in that the funds
were to be used for the vocational re-education of workmen not connected in
i

any way with some of the employers who were required to pay into the fund.
Further, the surplus of the fund was to be used by the Industrial Accident
Commission for administrative costs. That situation is analogous to the instant
case in every respect save that of exceeding constitutional authority which,
ultimately, is beside the point.
In People v. Yosemite Lumber Company. 216 P. 39 (Ca. 1923), the
California Court was asked to determine whether their prior decision in
Yosemite Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission served to render nugatory the
remaining provision of the Act in question. The Court again found that "a
compulsory payment of a definite sum by a certain class of persons known as
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employers" was "a charge upon persons or property" and that the purpose of
the fund was public in that it benefited persons in the state disabled in industry.
Therefore, the imposition was a tax. Supra at p. 42.
The California Court also held that the classification supporting the Act
was unreasonable in that it was based on a "purely adventitious condition,"
namely, that an employer should have an employee die without dependents.
This classification was found to be unreasonable in light of the above and
particularly in that the proceeds of the tax were to be devoted to the benefit "not
of the employers required to pay the tax, nor even of their employees, but to the
benefit and betterment of a class of persons bearing no relation to either,..."
Sypia at p. 43.
In the instant case, all employers are required to pay into the Uninsured
Employers'Fund when an employee dies with no dependents. This no
dependent death benefit has been held to be constitutional where the Fund to
be benefited thereby is for the betterment of all employees in general. This
benefit has not, however, been held to be constitutional where it is for the
employees of one class of employers, the insolvent and uninsured, and where
solvent, insured employers are compelled to pay into a Fund which will benefit
a class of persons to which they have no relation. Therefore, it is not only the
unreasonableness of the classification alone that thwarts constitutional
obligations in this situation, but rather the unreasonable classification in
conjunction with the discriminatory application; the solvent, insured employer
bearing, in reality if not in theory, the entire burden for employees of insolvent,
uninsured employers.

CONCLUSION
Payment of the no dependent death benefit by solvent, insured
employers into the Uninsured Employers' Fund for the benefit of the employees
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of insolvent, uninsured employers is unreasonable and discriminatory.
Therefore, the ruling of the Industrial Commission must be overturned.
DATED THIS

of July, 1987.
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
A Professional Corporation
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